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McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
     John Olson, a former employee of General Electric Astrospace 
("GE"), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of GE on claims Olson filed under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1210 et seq., ("ADA"), and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et 
seq.  The district court ruled that Olson failed to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADA or the 
LAD.  We agree that Olson did not demonstrate that he was 
disabled or had a record of impairment under the ADA.  However, 
we disagree that Olson did not demonstrate the existence of a 
material fact as to a perception of an impairment. Accordingly, 
we will affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
                                I. 
      John Olson began his employment with GE as a Senior Member, 
Technical Staff, in the Parts Engineering Department, on April 3, 
1988.  His job responsibilities generally included evaluating 
Non-Standard Part Approval Requests ("NSPARS") and writing Source 
Control Drawings ("SCDS") for microcircuits.  Throughout most of 
this period, Olson reported to Dale Sansoni, Manager of Parts 
Engineering.  Olson liked Sansoni and considered him a good 
supervisor.   
     On August 23, 1991, Sansoni prepared the only written 
performance appraisal of Olson's job performance at GE.  It 
covered the period from December 1988 to August 1991.  Sansoni 
gave Olson a rating of "2" on a scale of "1" to "5", with "5" 
being the highest score.  Sansoni's appraisal noted that Olson 
"needed improvement."  Olson apparently agreed with Sansoni's 
assessment. 
     In February of 1991, Olson was hospitalized for four months 
for depression. He returned to work in late May or early June of 
1991 although Sansoni gave Olson as much time off from work as he 
needed.  
     On September 11, 1991, GE told Olson that he was being laid- 
off along with hundreds of others as part of a general reduction 
in force necessitated by adverse business conditions. A month 
later, on October 11, 1991, Olson was formally laid-off. 
     In August of 1992, a former co-worker told Olson that the 
position of Quality Assurance Specialist was opening at GE's East 
Windsor, New Jersey facility.  The person hired as QA Specialist 
would report to Sansoni who was still the Manager of Parts 
Engineering.  Olson was interested and telephoned Sansoni, who 
encouraged Olson to apply.  On September 9, 1992, Olson submitted 
his application to the GE Transition Center in Princeton, New 
Jersey.  The application was forwarded to Amy Levinson-Close, 
Human Relations Manager. 
     Initially, Olson was one of four applicants.  Sansoni 
interviewed Olson for the position on September 21, 1992.  GE 
contends that because Sansoni already knew Olson and was familiar 
with his work, the interview focused on Olson's experiences since 
being laid-off. Olson contends that during that interview, 
Sansoni asked him if he had any further medical developments, and 
that Sansoni was referring to Olson's 1991 hospitalization for 
depression.  Olson alleges that approximately one-third of the 
interview concerned Olson's health and marital status. 
     According to Olson, Sansoni discussed the medication Olson 
was taking, and a one month hospitalization that Olson had 
admitted himself to for testing.  Olson did not, however, tell 
Sansoni that he had also been tested for Multiple Personality 
Disorder.  Olson contends that he and Sansoni also discussed an 
overnight hospitalization that Olson had undergone in order to 
diagnose a possible sleep disorder.  Olson maintains that he told 
Sansoni that all of the tests had been negative, and that the 
doctors had informed him that the most likely diagnosis was 
simply a sleep disorder.  According to Olson, Sansoni told him 
that he would recommend that Olson be hired for the position and 
that he would not be interviewing the other applicants. 
     A few days after Sansoni interviewed Olson, a co-worker gave 
Sansoni the resume of Jeffrey Venditte.  Venditte and the co- 
worker who gave Sansoni the resume had previously worked together 
at Hughes Aircraft Company and the co-worker highly recommended 
Venditte to Sansoni.  About one week after Sansoni interviewed 
Olson, Sansoni interviewed Venditte.  Sansoni considered both 
Olson and Venditte qualified for the job, but recommended 
Venditte to Christina Eggert who was Sansoni's superior.  GE 
maintains that Sansoni believed that Venditte had better 
experience than Olson with respect to parts overstressing and 
failure analysis which were two principal job requirements.   
Sansoni also believed that Venditte's work at Hughes and ITT 
would be valuable to GE.  At ITT, Venditte had been on a team 
that was responsible for a database management system used by 
four major subcontractors of GE.  At Hughes, Venditte had been 
involved in resolving spacecraft part failures, and that 
experience was related to the job he would perform at GE.   
     Sansoni and Eggert discussed Olson's and Venditte's 
qualifications, but Ms. Eggert made the final decision.  Eggert 
agreed with Sansoni's recommendation and hired Venditte. GE 
claims that Eggert and Sansoni discussed neither Olson's previous 
hospitalization nor his health in arriving at a decision to hire 
Venditte.  On October 21, 1992, Sansoni telephoned Olson and told 
him that another candidate had been hired. 
     On November 4, 1992, Olson filed a complaint with the EEOC, 
alleging that he was not hired because of his "disability" in 
violation of the ADA.   The EEOC conducted an investigation and 
on December 13, 1993, issued a no-cause determination. 
     On March 11, 1994, Olson filed a complaint against GE 
alleging that GE did not hire him because of his disability or 
perceived disability in violation of the ADA and the LAD. Olson 
alleges that his disability is "depression, sleep disorder and 
multiple personality disorder."  Complaint ¶ 16.   
     After the pleadings were closed, GE filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  The district court entered an Order granting 
summary judgment to GE and dismissing Olson's complaint with 
prejudice.  In a Memorandum Opinion accompanying the Order, the 
district court held that Olson had not established a prima faciecase under 
the ADA or the LAD because he failed to establish that 
he is disabled, that he has a history of impairment or that GE 
perceives him to be disabled.   
     This appeal followed. 
 
                               II. 
          Summary judgment is proper only where there is no 
genuine issue of material fact for the factfinder to decide. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  In order to demonstrate the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must supply 
sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury 
to find for the nonmovant.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. 
American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Our standard of review on an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. Id. at 146.   We apply the same test the 
district court should have used initially, Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 
(1991), and review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment was entered.  Coolspring 
Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d at 
146. 
 
                               III. 
A.  The ADA Claim. 
     The section of the ADA under which Olson brought his claim 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
          No covered entity shall discriminate against 
          a qualified individual with a disability 
          because of the disability of such individual 
          in regard to job application procedures, the 
          hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
          employees, employee compensation, job 
          training, and other terms, conditions, and 
          privileges of employment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12112.   
     It is now axiomatic that the familiar analytical framework 
first pronounced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792 (1973), for resolution of suits brought under Title VII, also 
guides an analysis of claims brought under the ADA. Newman v. GHS 
Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, 
Olson had the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case 
of unlawful discrimination.  To do so he had to establish that 
(1) he belongs to a protected category; (2) he applied for and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants.  Sheridan v. DuPont, ___ 
F.3d ___, No. 94-7509 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (en banc), Fuentes 
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing elements 
in a case of failure to hire or promote under Title VII).  In 
McDonnell Douglas, the court noted that "the facts necessarily 
will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification . . . of the 
prima facie proof required . . . is not necessarily applicable in 
every respect to different factual situations."  411 U.S. at 802 
n.13.  Olson's allegations reflect an alternative to the fourth 
element of the McDonnell Douglas scenario:  namely, a rejection 
of plaintiff accompanied, or followed by, a filling of the job 
with a person not belonging to the protected category.  If the 
plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden 
of production then shifts to the employer to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's 
rejection.  Id.  Once the employer articulates a legitimate 
reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the plaintiff 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's 
proffered explanation was pretextual. Id.  
     In order to defeat a summary judgment motion after the 
defendant answers plaintiff's prima facie case with legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must 
          point to some evidence, direct or 
          circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
          reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
          employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or 
          (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
          reason was more likely than not a motivating 
          or determinative cause of the employer's 
          action. 
 
Id. at 764.  The plaintiff "must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for 
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did 
not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons."  Id. at 765 
(internal citations, quotations and brackets omitted).  Once the 
plaintiff has pointed to some evidence which sufficiently 
discredits the employer's proffered reasons, plaintiff need not 
"also come forward with additional evidence of discrimination 
beyond his or her prima facie case."  Id. at 764.  Rather, the 
factfinder may consider the elements of plaintiff's prima facie 
case along with the rejection of the employer's explanation and 
conclude that illegal discrimination is more likely than not the 
true reason for the challenged employment action.  "It is the 
jury's determination that the reason given was pretextual 
together with the evidence that supported the prima facie case 
that will sustain a finding of intentional discrimination . . ."  
Sheridan, slip. op. at 20.  The factfinder is not, however, 
compelled to so find, as the plaintiff always has the burden of 
proof.  Id. at 763. 
     However, before the burden-shifting can even begin, Olson 
must show that he is a member of a protected class.  Olson argues 
that he is a member of the protected class because he meets each 
of the three categories of protection under the ADA. He argues 
he: (1) is disabled because he was hospitalized for depression 
for four months; (2) has a record of impairment because of his 
hospitalization and because of his diagnoses of Multiple 
Personality Disorder and a sleep disorder; and (3) is regarded as 
disabled by GE.   
     The ADA defines the term "disability" as: 
 
          (A) a physical or mental impairment that 
          substantially limits one or more of the major 
          life activities of such individual; 
 
          (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
 
          (C) being regarded as having such an 
          impairment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).  "Major Life Activities" include "functions 
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).  These activities are "substantially 
limit[ed]" when one is  
          (i) Unable to perform a major life activity 
          that the average person in the general 
          population can perform;  or 
          (ii) Significantly restricted as to the 
          condition, manner or duration under which an 
          individual can perform a particular major 
          life activity as compared to the condition, 
          manner, or duration under which the average 
          person in the general population can perform 
          that same major life activity. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).  In determining if a person is affected 
by a disability that "substantially limits" a "major life 
activity" we must consider several factors including:  
          (i) The nature and severity of the 
          impairment; 
          (ii) The duration or expected duration of the 
          impairment;  and 
          (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or 
          the expected permanent or long term impact of 
          or resulting from the impairment. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).  Our task is to determine if a person 
who claims a disability under the ADA is "significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a 
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). An "inability to perform a single, 
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in 
the major life activity of working." Id.  
     In granting summary judgment for GE and against Olson, the 
district court held that Olson had failed to establish a prima 
facie case that he was disabled.  The court stated: 
                    [c]onsidered separately or together, neither 
                    plaintiff's hospitalization nor his alleged 
                    emotional condition are enough to classify 
                    him as disabled for purposes of establishing 
                    a prima facie case under the ADA. Plaintiff 
                    has not demonstrated how, if at all, his 
                    alleged condition has impacted his life. On 
                    the contrary, plaintiff has indicated that he 
                    works, goes to school full time and regularly 
                    engages in recreational activities. The court 
                    therefore concludes that plaintiff has not 
                    made a prima facie showing that he is 
                    disabled.  
           
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. 
 
     Similarly the court denied Olson's claim that he had a 
record of impairment. In doing so, the court minimized the 
serious nature of Olson's depression and personality order.  The 
court stated: 
                    Plaintiff has apparently misunderstood what 
                    is meant by 'a record of such impairment.' 
                    That subsection . . . is intended to ensure 
                    that people are not discriminated against 
                    because of a history of disability.  This . . 
                    . is satisfied if a record relied on by an 
                    employer indicates that the individual has . 
                    . . had a substantially limiting impairment. 
                    . . . It is absolutely necessary for the 
                    plaintiff to show that the impairment . . . 
                    substantially limits one or more of the 
                    individual's major life activities.  . . .  
                    [N]either a diagnosis of multiple personality 
                    disorder nor a history of testing for sleep 
                    disorders will satisfy that burden. Plaintiff 
                    would have to show that, while those 
                    disorders were active, they substantially 
                    limited one of life's major activities. He 
                    has not done so. 
           
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7-8 (citations omitted). 
 
     Finally, the district court also concluded that Olson had 
not demonstrated that he was regarded or perceived as being 
disabled. It did so because Eggert, not Sansoni was responsible 
for not hiring Olson, and Olson could not demonstrate that Eggert 
knew of Olson's health problems. The court noted: 
                    Indeed, it is unlawful for an employer to 
                    base an employment decision on the belief 
                    that the employee is disabled. However, 
                    Christina Eggert, the individual who had the 
                    ultimate authority to make the hiring 
                    decision in question here, has certified that 
                    she did not discuss plaintiff's health with 
                    the interviewer and she was not aware that 
                    plaintiff suffered from depression, multiple 
                    personality disorder or any other type of 
                    mental illness. An employer cannot be said to 
                    have regarded an individual as disabled when 
                    the person charged with making the adverse 
                    employment decision lacked knowledge of the 
                    employee's condition.  
          Dist. Ct. Op.  at 8 (citations omitted). The court therefore 
concluded that Olson "failed to show that he belongs to a 
protected class, a threshold requirement of the ADA."  Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 9.  
     As noted earlier, we agree with the district court's 
conclusion that Olson did not show that he was either disabled or 
had a record of impairment within the meaning of the ADA. The 
evidence recited by the district court that reflects Olson's 
ability to function normally despite what appear to be serious 
psychological and emotional problems defeats that part of Olson's 
ADA claim.  Accordingly, the evidence that was apparently offered 
to demonstrate Olson's fitness as an employee ironically 
establishes that he was not substantially limited in a major life 
activity.  Therefore he can not establish that he is disabled, or 
that he has a history of being disabled.  However, we believe 
that Olson clearly demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact 
as to the third basis of his ADA claim.  A reasonable factfinder 
could conclude that he did not get the job because GE regardedhim as 
disabled. 
     The regulations provide that being "regarded as having such 
an impairment" means: 
          (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that 
          does not substantially limit major life 
          activities but is treated by a covered entity 
          as constituting such limitation;   
 
          (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that 
          substantially limits major life activities  
          only as a result of the attitudes of others 
          toward such impairment; or 
 
          (3) Has none of the impairments defined in 
          paragraphs (h)(1) or (2) of this section but 
          is treated by a covered entity as having a 
          substantially limiting impairment. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3).   Thus, Olson would be disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA if GE regarded Olson as having a 
disabling impairment.  See Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 
362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). 
     Olson argues that it is reasonable to  infer that GE 
perceived him to be disabled because at least one-third of his 
interview with Sansoni was spent discussing Olson's health, and 
because Sansoni's performance evaluation of Olson during Olson's 
prior employment with GE contains the following references to 
Olson's health:   
          John's time card charges are not always 
          entered on a daily basis.  On a number of 
          occasions I have not signed his time card 
          because he was out on personal illness. . . . 
          His work habits are questionable because he 
          has taken an unusual amount of time off for 
          personal illness reasons. 
 
          I have spoke (sic) to John on several 
          occasions regarding his personal illness.  I 
          depend on John to perform as a senior member 
          of my Technical Staff and I have questioned  
          his commitment to Parts Engineering. 
 
          A majority of John's appraisal was prepared 
          back in March of this year (when it was 
          originally due), however John went on 
          extended illness from March, 1990 to June 
          1990 which caused this performance discussion 
          to be delayed until now. 
 
Appellant's App at 35, 36.   Olson then appears to argue that 
because Sansoni reported to Eggert, a reasonable factfinder could 
conclude that Eggert was aware of Olson's health problems because 
of discussions she would most certainly have had with Sansoni. 
     In response GE points out that Eggert made the hiring 
decision, and she had no knowledge of Olson's health problems or 
history of hospitalizations.  GE reminds us that Eggert's 
certification establishes that she never discussed Olson's health 
with Sansoni, and that Olson's own statements establish that GE 
was unaware of Olson's condition at the time Venditte was hired. 
Olson's affidavit to the EEOC is part of the record in the 
district Court. In that affidavit Olson swore: 
          I wish to state for the record that I believe 
          Mr. Sansoni's questions about my health and 
          current marital status arose out of a sincere 
          desire to re-establish a friendly 
          relationship which we enjoyed prior to and 
          following my layoff from GE. 
 
Appellee's App. at 68.   Similarly, Olson testified in his 
deposition that "I don't believe that [Sansoni], in fact, 
discriminated against me on the basis of my health during the 
interview in 1992."  Appellee's App. at 38.               
     We agree that knowledge of Olson's hospitalization and 
illnesses cannot be imputed to Eggert.  She filed a Certification 
disclaiming any such knowledge, and Olson presented no evidence 
to the contrary.  Thus, the district court correctly concluded 
that Olson's theory of imputed knowledge was based upon sheer 
speculation, and was therefore insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact.  However, we need not impute Sansoni's 
knowledge of Olson's hospitalization and illnesses to Eggert to 
find that Olson was perceived as disabled by GE.  The error here 
occurred precisely because the district court limited its inquiry 
to Eggert's knowledge of Olson's disability rather than 
considering Sansoni's perception. Sansoni was directly involved 
in the hiring process, and it is uncontroverted that he knew of 
Olson's health problems. It is also uncontroverted that he 
recommended Venditte, not Olson, to Eggert who then offered the 
position to Venditte.  Sansoni had been Olson's supervisor, and 
was aware of Olson's hospitalization and illnesses.  He prepared 
the only written evaluation of Olson's performance at GE, and in 
it Sansoni made multiple references to the fact that Olson had 
missed a significant amount of work because of illness.  He 
specifically stated that Olson had been hospitalized for four 
months, and he noted that he had discussed illness-related 
absences with Olson on several occasions. Moreover, these 
absences caused Sansoni to question Olson's commitment to his 
job.  Finally, it is undisputed that Sansoni spent a significant 
amount of time during Olson's interview discussing Olson's health 
problems. 
     Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Olson as 
the nonmovant (as we must), it is clear that a reasonable fact- 
finder could infer that Sansoni perceived Olson to be disabled. 
One could reasonably conclude that this affected the 
recommendation Sansoni made to Eggert, and that that caused GE to 
hire Venditte.  
     Where a hiring decision is based largely or entirely on a 
recommendation or evaluation made by an employee who perceived 
the applicant as disabled, the employer can be held liable in a 
perception case. Thus, at least for summary judgment purposes, it 
is irrelevant whether Eggert knew of Olson's health problems or 
not. So long as Sansoni knew, and he clearly did, and so long as 
Eggert made her hiring decision based upon Sansoni's 
recommendation, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether GE perceived Olson as disabled.  
     Moreover, the cases that have found for the employer because 
the employer did not know of an employee's illness or condition 
are not to the contrary. In Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, 
International, Inc., 82 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 1996), a pregnancy 
discrimination suit under Title VII, the plaintiff offered no 
evidence that any of her managers knew she was pregnant. 
Therefore, even though she told some of her co-workers, absent 
evidence that someone in position of authority knew of her 
condition, she could not prevail against her employer. Similarly, 
in Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. Inc, 47 F.3d 928 (7th 
Cir. 1995), management relied upon a recommendation made by the 
plaintiff's supervisor in making the decision to fire the 
plaintiff. However, the supervisor's evaluation of the plaintiff 
was made before the supervisor knew of plaintiff's illness, and 
the plaintiff offered no evidence that any of the decisionmakers 
knew of his  illness when they fired him. In neither of these 
cases was the decision to discharge the plaintiff based largely 
or entirely upon a recommendation of a supervisor who knew of 
plaintiff's condition. 
     Similarly, in determining whether Olson is a member of a 
protected class, it is irrelevant whether Olson believed that 
Sansoni did not discriminate against him during the interview.  
Olson's belief in Sansoni's sincerity does not establish that 
Sansoni's recommendation was not, in fact, altered by his view of 
Olson's health.  Were summary judgment to be allowed on Olson's 
perception claim under such circumstances the already difficult 
task of proving discriminatory motive would be made significantly 
more difficult. 
                    The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine burden-shifting 
                    framework was created because only rarely 
                    will a plaintiff have direct evidence of 
                    discrimination. Gone are the days (if, 
                    indeed, they ever existed) when an employer 
                    would admit to firing an employee because she 
                    is a woman, over forty years of age, disabled 
                    or a member of a certain race or religion. . 
                    . . The elements of that prima facie case, 
                    however, must not be applied woodenly, but 
                    must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the 
                    circumstances of each type of illegal 
                    discrimination. 
           
Geraci, 82 F.3d at 581.  
 
     Viewing this record in the light most favorable to Olson, 
the nonmovant in summary judgment, it is clear that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether the recommendation 
that Sansoni made caused Venditte to be hired over Olson, and if 
so, whether that recommendation was affected by a perception that 
Olson was disabled within the meaning of § 12102(2)(C) of the 
ADA.  Because the district court incorrectly ruled that Olson did 
not establish that there was a question of material fact as to 
whether he was regarded as disabled by GE, and thus a member of a 
protected class, we will reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment as to the issue of GE's perception of 
disability. 
 
B.  The LAD claim. 
     The section of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination 
("LAD") under which Olson brought his claim provides, in relevant 
part: 
          the provisions of this act. . . prohibit any 
          unlawful discrimination against any person 
          because such person is or has been at any 
          time handicapped or any unlawful employment 
          practice against such person, unless the 
          nature and extent of the handicap reasonably 
          precludes the performance of the particular 
          employment. 
 
N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1.  The LAD thus uses the term "handicap" as 
opposed to "disability".  The district court did not discuss 
Olson's LAD claim because it ruled that its holding that Olson 
had not established a claim under the ADA also defeated his claim 
under the LAD.  The court stated, "[f]or the same reasons that 
plaintiff has failed to establish that he is disabled under the 
ADA, he has likewise failed to establish that he is within the 
class of persons protected by the LAD." Dist. Ct. Op. at 9, n.2.   
     It is clear that the same McDonnell Douglas framework that 
guides us under the ADA would also guide a New Jersey court under 
the LAD. See  McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 824 
(3d Cir.1994); Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 503- 
504 (3d Cir. 1995); Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486, 
490-491 (N.J.  1982); Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 667 A.2d 355, 
359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Grigoletti v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp., 570 A.2d 903 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1990).  It is 
not nearly so clear, however, whether a "disability" under the 
ADA is the same as a "handicap" under the LAD.    
     Olson argues that the LAD standard for demonstrating a 
"handicap" is much less stringent than the standard for 
demonstrating a "disability" under the ADA.  Specifically, he 
contends there is no requirement under the LAD that a handicap 
"substantially limit one or more of the major life activities" of 
an individual.   
     In Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court, rejecting a construction 
of the LAD that would make it applicable only to severe 
disabilities, wrote: 
          We need not limit this remedial legislation 
          to the halt, the maimed or the blind.  The 
          law prohibits unlawful discrimination against 
          those suffering from physical disability.  As 
          remedial legislation, the [LAD] should be 
          construed with that high degree of liberality 
          which comports with the preeminent social 
          significance of its purposes and objects.  
          Since the inception of the [LAD], our courts 
          have repeatedly recognized its humanitarian 
          concerns, its remedial nature and the liberal 
          construction accorded it.  The paramount 
          purpose of the statute is to secure to 
          handicapped individuals full and equal access 
          to society, bounded only by the actual 
          physical limits that they cannot surmount. . 
          . . [I]t would be ironic indeed for the 
          individual only slightly handicapped to be 
          denied coverage under the act while more 
          restricted individuals are accorded 
          protection.  The statute speaks in terms of 
          any physical disability.  There is simply no 
          basis for limiting its coverage to so-called 
          severe disabilities. 
 
446 A.2d at 492 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
Although the circumstances in Andersen caused the court to speak 
in terms of physical handicaps, the actual language of the LAD  
encompasses more than physical impairment.  The LAD provides, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
          "Handicapped" means suffering . . . from any 
          mental, psychological or developmental 
          disability resulting from anatomical, 
          psychological, physiological or neurological 
          conditions which prevents the normal exercise 
          of any bodily or mental functions or is 
          demonstrable, medically or psychologically, 
          by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
          techniques. 
 
N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q)(emphasis added). 
     Thus, it appears that Olson would be suffering from a 
handicap under the LAD if his depression, his sleep disorder or 
his multiple personality disorder, singly or in combination, 
would prevent the normal exercise of his bodily or mental 
functions (as may be required under the ADA's substantial 
limitation of a major life function) or if the disability is 
diagnosed under medically accepted techniques.  Accordingly, it 
may be that the LAD does not require that Olson demonstrate that 
his depression, sleep disorder, or multiple personality disorder 
"substantially limit[] one or more of [his] major life 
activities."  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), and that Olson can be 
handicapped under the LAD without being disabled under the ADA. 
However, we need not decide that issue now.  Upon remand, the 
district court will be able to resolve the LAD claim after 
reviewing additional briefs of the parties and the latest New 
Jersey authority.  We regret, however, that that determination 
must of necessity (given the absence of a certification procedure 
in New Jersey) be based upon a federal court's assessment of the 
current state of New Jersey law. 
 
                               IV. 
     For the above reasons, we will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to GE on Olson's claim under the ADA 
based on the district court's findings that Olson did not 
demonstrate that he was disabled or had a record of impairment.  
However, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment to GE on 
Olson's ADA claim that GE regarded him as disabled and remand on 
that issue only.  We will also reverse the grant of summary 
judgment to GE on Olson's LAD claim and remand for the district 
court to consider whether Olson demonstrated that he is 
handicapped as defined in the LAD.       
 
                            
